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ABSTRACT

WHAT DRIVES THE PROPERTY-TYPE FOCUS OF REITS?

BY

SEUNGHAN RO

December 2, 2010

Committee Chair:

Dr. Alan J. Ziobrowski

Major Academic Unit:

Real Estate

Using a sample of 678 property portfolio changes (acquisitions, dispositions and joint ventures)
of U.S. REITs during the period 1990 to 2009, I investigate the issue of what drives the property
sector focus of REITs. Geltner and Miller (2001) argue that investors prefer to make their own
diversification decisions using narrowly focused REITs as an explanation for the lack of
diversification. On the basis of their argument, I develop and examine the research question of
how investors react to a change in a REIT’s property type focus.

I find a significantly negative market reaction to acquisition and acquisitional JV events that
decrease property-type focus. However, I do not find consistent supporting evidence that

xi

dispositional events, including property sales and dispositional JVs which increase property-type
focus, yield significantly positive abnormal returns. Only in the limited case of other propertytype dispositional JVs do I find a statistically significant positive market reaction relative to
those derived from the dispositional events that do not change the property-type focus on the
basis of a difference test.

In terms of the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions, I also find strong evidence of a
diversification discount derived from acquisitional events that decrease the property-type focus
of a REIT regardless of the sample period and the type of property portfolio change. However, I
do not find evidence of a wealth benefit received by dispositional events which increase the
property-type focus. In addition, I find that the deal size of the property portfolio change relative
to the size of the firm and the number of security analysts following the firm are both significant
variables that affect the abnormal returns upon the announcement of a property portfolio change.
I also find no evidence to support the idea that the diversification discount comes from
endogeneity as argued by Villanova (2004).

xii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background
From a mean-variance perspective, diversification reduces the unsystematic risk associated with
the variability of a portfolio's return in excess of the market return. Optimal diversification is
defined as the set of assets that maximize the return for a given level of risk or, alternatively,
minimize the risk for a given level of return. Markowitz (1952) developed modern portfolio
theory (MPT) to formalize the concept of diversification for an investment portfolio. Markowitz
employed stocks to examine his theory; however it is equally applicable to bonds, real estate,
government treasury securities, and other financial assets.

Consistent with Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory, Young and Graff (1995) argue that
diversification within a real estate portfolio requires the composition of many different properties.
However, in terms of property-type diversification strategies, there is a conflict between the
investment behavior of large institutional real estate investors and Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs). In particular, large institutional real estate investors tend to own and manage properties
broadly diversified by property-type. On the other hand, REITs show a strong tendency to invest
in only one particular property-type.

Several studies show that the majority of institutional real estate investors such as life insurance
companies and pension funds consistently tend to diversify by property-type for their real estate
portfolios. Webb (1984) finds that nearly 61% of institutional investors diversify by propertytype. In a more recent survey, Louargand (1992) observes that 89% of institutional investors
1

diversify by property-type. According to Seiler, Webb and Myer (1999), intra-asset
diversification is employed to identify as many different groups of sub-asset classifications as
possible to maximize heterogeneity among sub-groups. This practice reduces the correlations
between the sub-groups and increases the diversification of the portfolio. Such an increase in
diversification reduces unsystematic risk and causes a corresponding increase or upward and
leftward shift in the efficient frontier. Thus, the greater the intra-asset diversification provides
greater reduction in overall unsystematic risk, and the higher optimum level of portfolio
efficiency.

In contrast, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have a tendency to concentrate their
investments into a single property-type. According to the National Association of Real Estate
Investment Trusts (NAREIT) Handbooks (1997–2008), more than 90% of the REITs in the U.S.
equity REIT sector focus on one property-type or occasionally two closely related property-types.
The other 10% of the equity REIT sector is diversified by property-type in terms of either total
market capitalization or number of properties. In the early days of REITs, diversified REITs
dominated the industry. Figure 1 shows that diversified property REITs accounted for more than
30% of NAREIT index during the 1980s. In recent years, REIT management has shifted its
strategy. The percentage of diversified REITs has decreased steadily as REITs have tended to
specialize in the various property sectors such as healthcare, hotels, apartments, retail, office and
industrial. Thus the conflict with Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory, and the inconsistent
investment behavior of REIT management with the diversification strategy of institutional real
estate investors both motivate the fundamental research question of this study. What drives the
property sector focus of REITs?
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There are several theories which attempt to explain this contradictory behavior. Prior corporate
finance literature finds the existence of the ―diversification discount‖ referring to a negative
correlation between the market value of a firm’s assets and the degree of diversification in the
assets it holds. They find diversified firms tend to trade at a discount relative to similar focused
firms. Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Comment and Jarrell (1995) find a
negative association between firm performance and diversification within the firm. The idea
behind these findings is that investors do not want to invest in firms who do their diversifying for
them. Investors prefer to make their own diversification decisions. Consistent with this theory,
Geltner and Miller (2001) argue that early REITs often diversified by property-type since
individual relatively small REIT investors wanted passive investment vehicles and thus were best
served by a diversified portfolio of properties. But in the 1990s, REIT investors became
dominated by institutions that prefer to make their own diversification decisions. Thus REITs
responded to the needs of their investors by becoming more focused.

Another theory argues that once REITs became more actively managed based on the belief that
management expertise could usually be more effective when it specialized by property-type. Not
only REITs but also mutual funds have a strong tendency to focus on investments in areas where
they believe they have expertise. However, Ro and Ziobrowski (2009) examine whether the
management expertise of focused REITs drives their lack of diversification and find no evidence
of superior performance associated with REIT property-type focus. In addition, Yao, Clifford,
and Berens (2004) find that hedge fund sector specialists on the whole, are no better than
generalists in terms of their exposure to systematic risk.

3

Purpose of the Study
In this research, I examine the diversification discount of REITs. If investors prefer to make their
own portfolio diversification decisions by employing pure-play REITs (property sector focused
REITs), I hypothesize that investors will react positively to a REIT’s property portfolio changes
which reconfirm their narrow property-type focus. Conversely, investors should react negatively
to events which decrease a REIT’s property-type focus (i.e. the REIT diversifies). To investigate
this research hypothesis, I identify a sample of publicly announced property portfolio changes by
REITs coming from property acquisitions, disposition, joint ventures and mergers from 1990 to
2009, and employ standard event-study methodology to compute abnormal returns around the
announcement date for these events. In addition, as a robustness check, this study splits a sample
period (1990 – 2009) into two sub-periods: (1990-1999) and (2000-2009).

Extending the implication of the argument further suggests the second research question, “In the
presence of appropriate controls, what additional explanatory variables significantly influence
abnormal returns on events which change a REIT’s property-type focus?” I employ crosssectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to investigate the relationship between
abnormal returns and a set of potential variables of interests as suggested by the literature.

Importance of the Study
This dissertation extends the literature in four important ways. First it tests Geltner and Miller’s
(2001) explanation for the lack of diversification among REITs. The most prior studies examine
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the relationship between performance and diversification strategy and find evidence of a
diversification discount. However, several studies have been critical of the diversification
discount arguing that endogeneity in the data may have caused the negative relationship between
firm value and diversification (Campa and Kedia 2002, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf 2002,
Villaonga 2004). To avoid endogeneity, I control for operating performance prior to the
announcements of portfolio changes. Second, this dissertation fills a gap in the literature by
investigating the market reaction when REITs reconfirm or invest contrary to their focus. Prior
literature including Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003) finds wealth benefits received when
companies reconfirm their geographical focus in the acquisition. However, they do not examine
the wealth effect in terms of property-type diversification. Third, prior literature finds evidence
of the wealth effect based on the change of REITs property portfolio diversification associated
only with acquisitions and mergers. This dissertation provides evidence for a more
comprehensive range of events adding property dispositions and joint ventures.

Finally I

examine the influence of certain variables of interests on abnormal returns associated with a
change in a REIT’s property-type focus.

Organization of Dissertation
While this chapter provides a general introduction to the study, the remainder of this dissertation
is organized as follows. The second chapter reviews the relevant literature. The third chapter
presents the data construction and test methodology. The fourth chapter provides the empirical
results and discussion. The fifth chapter concludes the dissertation and suggests future areas of
study.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview of the Literature Review
The literature review is presented in three sections: diversification issues in finance studies,
diversification issues in real estate studies, and the wealth effect of real estate portfolio
transaction studies. The diversification issues in finance studies reviews several theories
associated with the relationship between firm value and diversification, mainly developed in the
finance literature. The literature of the diversification issues in real estate studies focuses on
property-type diversification covering REITs and other real estate investments. The literature of
the wealth effect of real estate portfolio transaction studies discusses the studies of the wealth
effect of REITs around changes in property portfolios.

Diversification Issues in Finance Studies
While a number of finance studies attempt to examine the relationship between the market value
of the firm and the degree of its diversification, the evidence still remains debated. Early finance
literature on the diversification issues finds the existence of the ―diversification discount,‖ where
diversified firms are valued at a discount relative to focused firms, and develops several theories
to support the empirical findings. However, more recently, several studies criticize the earlier
diversification discount studies. They argue that the diversification discount results from the
systematic difference between a stand-alone firm and a single segment of a multi-segment firm,
resulting in endogeneity issues.

6

Diversification Discount
A number of corporate finance studies find evidence of a diversification discount. Lang and
Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and DeLong (2001) all find
negative correlation between firm value and the degree of diversification. There are several
alternative theories which may explain the observation that diversification reduces the value of
the firm: information asymmetry, agency cost, and the inefficient internal allocation of capital.

Ferris and Sarin (2000) argue that a more diversified firm trades at a discount relative to a
focused firm because a diversified firm has more informational asymmetry between a firm’s
managers and its investors. This makes investors less likely to invest in the firm. They find that
more diversified firms have less analyst following, lower analysts’ consensus and greater
forecast error than focused firms, which results in an increase in information asymmetry and
negatively affects the value of diversified firms.

Bhushan (1989) also finds a negative

relationship between the number of analysts and the number of lines of businesses. He argues
that because of the increased number of business lines that the analysts must follow, the greater
the difficulty and cost. Thus diversified firms have fewer analysts than more focused firms. In
addition, diversified firms have more heterogeneous information sets among analysts, which
result in a reduced consensus among analysts. Chung and Jo (1996) find a positive relationship
between the number of security analysts tracking a firm and the market value of the firm. They
argue that investors tend to trade securities which they recognize and the cognizance stems from
information provided by security analysts, which reduces information asymmetry.
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Agency cost has also been linked to the diversification discount. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997)
argue that the diversification discount occurs because there is the conflict of interest between the
shareholders and the managers of a publicly owned firm. Diversification may benefit managers
because management’s power or managerial compensation is associated with firm size. Thus,
managers tend to sustain diversification strategy even if it reduces shareholder benefit. They find
managerial equity ownership is negatively related to the level of diversification. Jensen (1986)
argues that firm growth benefits managers since it increases management’s power and prestige.
Diversification is one means of growth. Jensen and Murphy (1990) find evidence that
diversification raises the compensation of managers since managerial compensation is positively
related to the size of a firm. Consistent with agency cost theory, Amihud and Lev (1981) find
that managers engage in diversification to reduce their undiversified employment risk (e.g. risk
of losing their job).

Several studies find that the resource allocation in diversified firms differs from that in focused
firms, suggesting that diversified firms tend to misallocate internal capital. Stulz (1990) finds
that firm diversification results in inefficient internal capital investments such as overinvestment
in low-performing businesses. Lamont (1997) also finds that diversified firms allocate their
internal capital inefficiently, overinvesting in poor sectors. Shin and Stulz (1998) argue that
diversified firms tend to disregard traditional market indicators of the value such as Tobin’s q
since different business segments are associated with different market indicators. They find
evidence of inefficiency in the capital allocation of diversified firms. Rajan, Servaes and
Zingales (2000) find that increases in diversity of resources and opportunities in diversified firms
result in more inefficient investment and less valuable firms.
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Challenges to the Diversification Discount
Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) and Villaonga (2004) challenge
evidence of the diversification discount. They argue that the diversification discount results from
an endogeneity bias since stand-alone firms are not comparable to segments of multi-segment
(diversified) firms. They find that diversification does not destroy value. Rather diversification
is the acquisition of already discounted businesses segments. Poor performance firms tend to
diversify to enhance their firm value, which makes diversified firms appear to have a
diversification discount. Campa and Kedia (2002) employ instrumental variables such as firm,
industry, and macroeconomic characteristics in two-stage regressions to control for endogeneity
and find evidence that the lower value of diversified firms results from an endogeneity bias.
They find no evidence of a diversification discount after controlling for this endogeneity in the
Compustat database. Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) are critical of prior studies that assume
each segment of a diversified firm is comparable to a ―typical‖ stand-alone firm as a benchmark.
They find evidence supporting systematic differences between segments of diversified firms and
the stand alone firms (endogeniety), which are not comparable. Villaonga (2004) finds that
diversified firms trade at a discount prior to further diversification into additional business
divisions.

Diversification Issues in Real Estate Studies
While variety topics in diversification issues are explored in real estate studies, this review
mainly focuses on literature in terms of property-type diversification. It classifies studies into
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studies employing real estate investment and studies focusing on real estate investment trusts
(REITs).

Property-type Diversification in Real Estate Investment
De Witt (1996) finds that the majority of real estate fund managers have strategies to diversify by
property-type as well as by location for their real estate portfolio construction. Firstenberg, Ross,
and Zisler (1988) investigate the performance of more than 600 individual real properties from
1974 to 1987. They classify the properties into four types: office, retail, industrial and apartments,
and create mean-variance efficient portfolios composed of real estate only and another composed
of mix-assets with real estate, common stocks and bonds. They find that including different
property-types in real estate portfolios increases the efficiency of both portfolios.

Lee (2001) employs data on retail, office and industrial properties around 326 different locations
in the United Kingdom during the period 1981 – 1995 to investigate real estate returns in terms
of property-type and regional factors. He finds that the level of risk reduction resulting from
property-type diversification is significantly greater than that achieved solely by regional
diversification. Hartzell, Hekman, and Miles (1986) examine quarterly data from a single
institutional portfolio composed of 270 properties over the ten years 1973 – 1983 and find that
property sector diversification offers more effective risk reduction for real estate investment
when compared to regional diversification. Miles and McCue (1984), Lee and Byrne (1998),
Fisher and Liang (2000) and Byrne and Lee (2000) find similar evidence.
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Cronqvist, Hogfeldt, and Nilsson (2001) employ a portfolio composed of 32 Swedish real estate
firms from 1990 to 1996 to examine the value loss for firms signaling the intention of following
a diversifying strategy. They find that when firms diversify they pay too much when acquiring
new assets and when hiring and firing employees in the creation of the new organization. They
also find that firms pursuing diversified strategies tend to have private rather than institutional
ownership.

Boer, Brounen, and Veld (2005) examine how the corporate focus of real property companies
affects their stock performance employing data from 275 international real property companies
in the U.S. and Europe over 1984 – 2002. They find that property companies in the U.S. have a
tendency to focus on property-type while those in European countries are more likely to focus on
geographical regions. In terms of analyzing the relationship between firm focus and stock
performance, they find that firms with geographical focus significantly outperform the overall
market while the stock performance is positively related to property-type focus. In addition, this
study finds that an increase in firm focus increases firm-specific risk.

Property-type Diversification in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
As mentioned in Chapter one, many of the early REITs maintained a property-type
diversification strategy. Pagliari, Scherer, and Monopoli (2005) show that during the 1980s more
than 30% of REITs were composed of diversified REITs although that percentage has fallen
steadily. Boer, Brounen, and Veld (2005) also find that in the early nineties, the average number
of different property-types in a REIT’s portfolio was more than three; today this number has
fallen below two. Geltner and Miller (2001) suggest three explanations for the change. First,
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earlier REITs were often diversified by property-type because REIT investors wanted passive
investment vehicles and thus were best served by a diversified portfolio of properties. But, after
the significant legislative changes to the REIT structure in 1993, REIT investors became
dominated by institutions that prefer to make their own diversification decisions. Second, as
REITs became more actively managed, they acquired management expertise that specialized by
property-type. That is, they exhibited a strong tendency to focus on investments in areas where
they believed they had expertise requiring distinct and highly specialized management skill.
Third, investors prefer assets that are simpler to understand and evaluate thus reducing
information asymmetry. Since focused REITs are less complex than diversified REIT, they are
therefore easier to analyze and thus more highly valued.

Miles and McCue (1982) examine the ratio of return to risk of equity REIT portfolios compared
to commingled real estate funds from 1972 to 1978, regressing on variables including propertytype, size, and location. They find the correlation between different property-types is relatively
low and conclude that property-type diversification provides significantly higher risk adjusted
cash yields in comparison to the other variables.

Gyourko and Nelling (1996) examine whether the type of property and the regional distribution
of properties held in the underlying portfolio of REITs influences the systematic risk of the REIT.
They find no meaningful impact for either property-type or geographical diversification in their
REIT stock market return data. However, this study employs a relatively limited data period
(1990 – 1992) before institutions were legally permitted to invest in REITs.

12

Chen and Peiser (1999) examine how the performance of REITs before 1993 differs from that of
REITs after 1992 when institutions became active in the REIT market. They find that after 1992,
REITs somewhat outperform the REITs before 1992 while risk patterns are not very different. In
addition, they also classify the various REIT property-types by average monthly return, standard
deviation, and beta. They find property-type focused REITs perform better than diversified
REITs, but provide no analysis of the statistical margin of the difference.

Capozza and Seguin (1999) investigate the effect of REIT specialization by analyzing cash flows
and firm value. They concentrate on the issue of whether management expertise in terms of focus
and diversification strategy affects REIT performance and value. They conclude that more
diversified REITs actually make higher gross yields from their properties. However, the higher
gross-cash-flow yields of diversified REITs are offset by higher corporate-level expenses, which
results in the reduction of value. In terms of cash flows available to shareholders, they find no
evidence that the cash flows vary with REIT specialization. This study analyzes the value of
REITs on the basis on property level cash flow rather than REIT performance from the
perspective of investors in stock market.

Eichholtz, Op’t Veld, and Schweitzer (2000) examine the returns of US equity REITs from 1990
to 1996 to determine whether managerial focus of REITs explains performance. To measure the
performance of REITs in terms of property-type and regional diversification, they use Jensen’s
alpha from CAPM and multifactor models and find evidence supporting the notion that propertytype focused REITs perform better than property-type diversified REITs while regionally
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focused REITs underperform regionally diversified REITs. However, the sample period (1990 –
1996) spans one of the most significant periods of change in the US REITs industry.

Benefield, Anderson, and Zumpano (2008) examine the diversification discount related to a
property-type diversification in equity REITs. They employ 75 US equity REITs from 1995 to
2006 to analyze the performance in terms of Jensen’s Alpha, the Treynor Index, and the Sharpe
Ratio. They find evidence that diversified REITs significantly perform better than focused REITs
for the period 1995 – 2001. However, this study does not match the property-type composition of
diversified and focused REITs. That is, the sample selected by Benefield et al. for property type
focused REITs does not accurately reflect the property type mix in their diversified REIT sample.
Since different property-types may perform better than other property-types in different time
periods (Gallo, Lockwood, and Rutherford 2000), different compositions of property-types may
result in bias. Pagliari, Scherer, and Monopoli (2005) and Riddiough, Moriatry, and Yeatman
(2005) also argue that portfolios with different property-type compositions are not fully
comparable when different real estate property indices have different mixes of property types.
Benefield, Anderson, and Zumpano also ignore the differences in leverage between portfolios.
Riddiough, Moriatry, and Yeatman (2005) find evidence that mismatched leverage may result in
over a 2% annual return difference for the comparison.

Ro and Ziobrowski (2009) also examine whether property-type focused REITs perform better
than diversified REITs. In order to compare performance, they construct two different portfolios;
one is composed of only focused property REITs and the other composed of only diversified
property REITs. They then match the various property-type allocations in the both portfolios and
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rebalance annually. They investigate abnormal returns employing CAPM and the Fama-French
three-factor model with Carhart’s momentum factor and find no evidence of superior
performance associated with property-type focused REITs. Consistent with modern portfolio
theory, they also find higher market risk associated with focused REITs.

Wealth Effect of Real Estate Portfolio Transaction Studies
Early literature on the wealth effects of real estate portfolio changes suggest that property
portfolio transactions are value-creating events for sellers, but value-neutral events for buyers.
For example, Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans (1991) employ standard event study methodology
to examine the wealth effect of transactions which realign real estate portfolios. They utilize a
sample of 150 real property transaction announcements including 99 buyers and 51 sellers over
1971 – 1986. They find statistically significant positive abnormal returns for sellers associated
with real property transactions while the abnormal returns of buyers are not statistically different
from zero. Elayan and Young (1994) investigate the wealth effects of shareholders on merger or
acquisition announcements in which the buyer or seller is a real estate company. They also find
evidence that shareholders of seller companies experience statistically significant abnormal
returns while those of buyer companies do not have significant excess returns. McIntosh, Ott and
Liang (1995) examine the shareholder wealth effects of REITs on the property transaction
announcement and find consistent evidence supporting that there is no significant excess return
on acquisition events while sale transaction events experience positive excess returns. Booth,
Glascock and Sarkar (1996) also find similar results employing more precise event data and a
more appropriate method, GARCH, to estimate expected returns and standard errors. They
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attempt to explain this finding using differences in the tax treatments for buyers and sellers, or
the number of buyers relative to the number of sellers.

However, Campbell, Petrova, and Sirmans (2003) analyze the shareholder wealth effects of 209
REIT portfolio acquisitions over the period 1995 to 2001. Inconsistent with prior literature, they
find evidence of significant abnormal returns on the acquisition announcement in the aggregate.
Furthermore, they find wealth benefits received when companies reconfirm their geographic
focus in the acquisition. The events that do not reconfirm (diversify) their regional focus exhibit
negative insignificant abnormal returns. However, they do not examine the wealth effect in terms
of property-type diversification.

Campbell, Gosh, and Sirmans (2001) examine a sample of 85 merger transactions over the
period 1994 – 1998 when a publicly traded equity REIT is an acquirer. The sellers of 40 events
are public REITs while the other 45 events have private sellers. Among 40 public-to-public
mergers, 25 mergers increased the geographic diversification of the acquiring firms while 25 out
of 45 public-to-private mergers also increased geographic diversification. They find evidence of
negative market reaction when the mergers increased the geographic diversification of acquirers,
which is consistent with Campbell, Petrova, and Sirmans (2003).

Campbell, Petrova, and Sirmans (2006) investigate the shareholder wealth effects of property
disposition by equity REITs for 1992 – 2002. They find evidence of significant positive
abnormal returns on disposition announcements. However, this study does not examine how the
market reacts to changes of focus affected by property sell-offs.
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Campbell, White-Huckins, and Sirmans (2006) examine 185 Joint Ventures by REITs from 1994
to 2001 and find that the market positively reacts to the announcement of joint ventures by
REITs. In particular, they find positive significant abnormal returns on the announcement of
joint ventures if the REIT’s JV partner is a property-type diversified REITs rather than propertytype focused REITs. They argue that property-type diversified REITs employ the JVs to obtain
highly specialized management expertise in particular property-types, and thus diminish the
managerial problems associated with property-type diversification.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents sources of empirical data and the methodology used to examine the
following research hypotheses.

Hypothesis
This study is motivated by the lack of property-type diversification in REITs and investigates a
theory developed by Geltner and Miller (2001), i.e. investors prefer to make their own
diversification decisions with pure-play (property-type focused) REITs. To develop the first
research hypothesis, Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003) find a significant positive abnormal
return to the announcement of the property acquisition to reconfirm their geographical focus.
Abnormal returns associated with an announcement which reduces geographic focus are
insignificantly different from zero. However, they do not examine the market’s reaction to
announcements affecting property-type diversification. Therefore, in this dissertation I examine
the following research hypotheses.

H1: The market has a significant positive reaction to the announcement of a REIT’s
property portfolio changes (dispositions, or dispositional JVs) which increase their
narrow property-type focus.
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H2: The market has a significant negative reaction to the announcement of a REIT’s
property portfolio changes (acquisitions, or acquisitional JVs) which decreases a REIT’s
property-type focus.

Data
Identification of Property Portfolio Changes of REITs
Following Campbell, Petrova, and Sirmans (2003 and 2006), I obtain information on
announcements about the property portfolio changes (acquisition, disposition, joint venture or
merger) of REITs from the Dow Jones News Retrieval using the Dow Jones Factiva Online
Database service in the years 1990 – 2009. To be included in the sample, an announcement must
be found in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters Newswires. The
announcement day refers to the date of the first report of the portfolio change in one of these
publications, which provides a trading day if the announcement is made before 3:59 p.m.
However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered to be the next
trading day after the announcement. I exclude a transaction from the sample if other significant
events are announced during the event window or a transaction with a total value less than 5
million. In terms of the sample selection, I exclude property-type diversified REITs due to the
difficulty in defining the property portfolio change which increases or decreases property-type
focus.

Identification of Property-types and Daily Return of REITs
I employ daily return data obtained from the CRSP/Ziman US Real Estate Data Series which
provides return series for individual REITs trading on the NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange
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and American Stock Exchange. This database provides property-type classifications for
individual REITs including health care, industrial and office, residential, lodging and resort,
retail, self storage, and diversified.

Identification of the control variables measured for each property portfolio change
We obtain the information regarding the size of property portfolio changes by REITs from press
releases, and from 10Q and 10K SEC filings prior to the announcement. Property type and
geographical focus change are obtained from the SNL Real Estate database and also from 10Q
and 10K SEC filings. Other accounting data including total assets, debt and funds from
operations (FFO) are obtained from COMPUSTAT and from 10Q and 10K SEC filings. The
numbers of analysts following each REIT are obtained from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate
System (IBES). I obtain institutional holdings from the CDA/Spectrum 13 (f) Institutional
Holdings, provided by Thomson Reuters.

Methodology
Standard Event Study Methodology
Following Mikkelson and Partch (1986), I employ standard event study methodology to
investigate the abnormal return for an equally balanced portfolio around the event announcement
date (acquisition, disposition, or joint venture). I use the market model to estimate the abnormal
return in reaction to the event, using daily returns with the following equation:

Ri ,t   i  i Rm ,t   i ,t

(1)
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where Ri ,t is the rate of return on security i over the period t, which is one day, Rm ,t is the rate of
return on the equally weighted market index. The CRSP value-weighted market return is used as
the market proxy. Daily returns are obtained from the CRSP database. Day 0 is the
announcement day,  i is the estimated intercept, i is the estimated slope of the linear
relationship between security i and the return on the market index, and  i ,t is the unsystematic
component of security i’s return on day t.

The estimated expected return for security i at time t given the daily return is the following:

Rˆi ,t  ˆi  ˆi Rm,t

(2)

where ˆi and ˆi are estimates of i and i . I obtain these estimates using 60 daily returns from
day t-250 through day t-20.

The abnormal return (AR) for security i at time t is given by the following equation:

ARi ,t  Ri ,t  Rˆi ,t  Ri ,t  (ˆi  ˆi Rm,t )

(3)

The market model, equation (1), is applied to all samples and abnormal returns are calculated for
each event day associated with the announcement. To compute the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR), I use one-day (Day 0), two-day (Days 0, +1), and three-day (Days -1, 0, +1) windows for
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the time horizon of the announcement period. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for
security i is the sum of ARi ,t over the various window periods (1, 2, and 3-day), given by:

T2

CARi ,t   ARi ,t

(4)

t T1

where T1 is the first day of the interval and T2 is the last day of the interval.

The mean cumulative abnormal return (MCAR) for a sample of N securities is given by,

MCARi 

1
N

N

 CAR

(5)

i

i 1

The expected value of the CAR is not different from zero if there is no abnormal return
performance. Following Elayan and Young (1994), I employ a t-test for the statistical
significance of the abnormal return over various window periods (1, 2, and 3-day). The variance
of the CARs is calculated from t-120 to t-21 and any possible first order serial dependence in the
excess returns is given by:

Var ( MCART1 ,T2 )  (T )Var ( MCARt )  2(T  1)Cov( MCARt , MCARt 1 )

where T  T2  T1  1 ,
Var ( MCARt ) 

t  21

 (MCAR  MCAR

t 120

t

m

) 2 / 99
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(6)

MCARm 

t  21

 MCAR /100 , and

t 120

t

Cov( MCARt , MCARt 1 ) 

t  21

 (MCAR  MCAR

t 120

t

m

)(MCARt 1  MCARm ) / 99

The t-statistic for the MCAR over the various intervals from T1 and T2 is

t  MCART 1,T 2 / Var ( MCART 1,T 2 )

(7)

If T1 = T2, tMCART 1,T 2 is equivalent to the t-statistic for MCARt .

Cross-Sectional Regression
I develop a cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression model to examine the relationship
between abnormal returns and a set of potential variables of interests. The control variables are
selected on the basis of prior literature. I develop the following cross-sectional regression model
to investigate the relationship.

AR    1 PROPD   2 PROPF  3 ln SIZE   4 SIZER  5 DEBTR  6 PFFO
 7 INST  8 ANALY  9 GEOD  10 ACDS  11 ADJV  12 JVRT  

(8)

where:
AR

= Abnormal returns for an equally balanced portfolio around the event
announcement;
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PROPD = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change decreases
property type focus and 0 otherwise;

PROPF = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change increases property
type focus and 0 otherwise;

ln SIZE = Natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior
to the announcement;

SIZER = The ratio of the total price of property portfolio change divided by the firm’s
total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement (SIZE);
DEBTR = Debt ratio or the total debt divided by the total assets of the firm at the end of

the last quarter prior to the announcement;

PFFO = Funds from Operations divided by total assets at the end of the last quarter
prior to the announcement;

INST

= Number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total
number of shares outstanding at the end of the last quarter prior to the
announcement;

ANALY = Number of analysts’ forecasts of FFO for the REIT at the end of the last
quarter prior to the announcement;

GEOD = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change decreases
geographical focus and 0 otherwise;

ACDS

= Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from
acquisition or acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise;

ADJV

= Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from
acquisition or disposition and 0 otherwise;

24

JVRT

= Dummy variable equal to 1 if a JV partner is another REIT and 0 otherwise

PROPD is my primary variable of interest. PROPD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
property portfolio change decreases property type focus and 0 otherwise. I hypothesize that this
variable should be significantly negative suggesting that any reduction in the portfolio focus is
viewed negatively by investors.

PROPF is another primary variable of interest. PROPF is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
property portfolio change increases property type focus and 0 otherwise. I hypothesize that this
variable should be significantly positive suggesting that any substantial increment in the portfolio
focus is viewed positively by investors.

I control for the firm size because several studies in the finance literature find a negative
association between abnormal returns and firm size (Loderer and Martin 1990; Asquith, Bruner,
and Mullins 1983). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that larger companies’ managers are less
bound by shareholder discipline since shareholders exercise less governing power in large firms.

I control for the size ratio between the size of property portfolio change and the size of the REIT
using SIZER since Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006) find a significant positive relationship
between abnormal returns on a property sale by a REIT and the size ratio. Clearly the larger the
size of the transaction relative to the size of the REIT, the greater is the impact on firm
performance.
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I control for the firm’s debt ratio by using DEBTR, which is the total debt divided by the total
assets of the firm. According to free cash flow theory suggested by Jensen (1986), firms with
higher leverage make better investment decisions since less free cash flow leaves them less likely
to waste resources. Stulz (1990), Maloney, McCornmic, and Mitchell (1993) and Kang (1993)
also find a significant positive relationship between leverage and returns.

I control for endogeneity using a REIT’s operating performance prior to the announcement of a
portfolio change. PFFO, is Funds from Operations divided by total assets. Villanova (2004)
finds that diversified firms trade at a discount prior to their further diversification into additional
business divisions. This implies that the diversification discount results from endogeneity.
Controlling the operating performance prior to the announcement of a portfolio change, I
investigate whether the diversification discount may be caused by endogeneity.

REIT institutional holdings are controlled for using INST. As shown in Figure 1, REIT
management has shifted its strategy through time. In the early days of REITs, diversified
property-type REITs dominated the industry. However, REITs have tended to focus on a single
property-type since the early 1990s when REIT investors became dominated by institutions that
may prefer to make their own diversification decisions.

The number of analysts that forecast the FFO for a REIT is controlled for using ANALY. Chung
and Jo (1996) find that the number of security analysts positively affects the market value of the
firm. Ferris and Sarin (2000) also find more diversified firms have fewer analysts following the
firms’ performance.
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Geographical focus changes are controlled for using GEOD, which is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the property portfolio change decreases geographic focus and 0 otherwise. Campbell,
Petrova and Sirmans (2003) find wealth benefits are received when companies reconfirm their
geographical focus in an acquisition while events which reduce their regional focus exhibit
negative wealth benefits. Following Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003), I define the event to
decrease geographical focus as the property transaction which expands its property portfolio into
states where it was not previously operating.

Acquisitional events including acquisitions and acquisitional JVs are controlled for using ACDS,
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from acquisition or
acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise (dispositions or dispositional JV). Campbell, White-Huckins,
and Sirmans (2006) find positive abnormal returns on acquisitional JV announcements while
negative abnormal returns are expected on dispositional JV events.

Property transactions including acquisitions and dispositions are controlled for using ADJV,
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from acquisition or
disposition and 0 otherwise (JVs).

JV with other REITs as a partner is controlled for using JVRT. Campbell, White-Huckins, and
Sirmans (2006) find positive abnormal returns when a REIT has a JV with another REIT. They
argue that it is difficult for a REIT to have synergies with a non-REIT partner due to the unique
REIT institutional structure.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of 678 sample US Equity REIT property portfolio change
events by year of announcement and property-type over the sample period 1990 – 2009. A
balanced cross sectional sample represents the REIT property-type population in terms of the
number of REIT. As shown by the table, over 80% of the sample events occurred in the
office/industrial, residential, and retail REIT sectors. The sample includes 140 different REITs
and covers all different property-type focused REITs, but excludes property-type diversified
REITs due to the difficulty in defining the property portfolio change which increases or
decreases property-type focus. I examine a relationship between abnormal return and REIT
property-type, and find no significant relationship.1 In terms of the announcement by year, the
distribution over the sample period varies, but most property portfolio change events occur after
1993. I find no property portfolio change event by a joint venture over the sub-period 1990 –
1993 since REITs had not employed joint ventures as an investment strategy prior to 1994
(Campbell, White-Huckins, and Sirmans 2006). I test for a relationship between the abnormal
return and the time of the event and find no evidence of the significant relationship.2

Table 2 summarizes data on the average value of deal size by year of announcement over the
sample period. In terms of property transactions including acquisitions and dispositions (Panel
A), the average value of the 463 property acquisitions and dispositions is over $ 37 million.
1
2

The results are available upon request.
The results are available upon request.
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During the early- and mid-1990s, the size of the deals was relatively small, less than $ 20 million.
However, it rose significantly during the late 1990s and continued to stay around $ 40 million in
2000s. In terms of joint ventures (Panel B), the average size of the 215 deal was over $ 251
million. We also see the similar tendency increasing deal sizes after the mid-1990s. This
tendency follows the remarkable growth of the equity REIT market after 1993, triggered by
legislative changes to the REIT structure which made REITs more attractive investment to
institutional investors. As we would expect, Table 2 clearly shows that JV deal sizes were much
larger than property transactions (acquisitions and dispositions).

Table 3 is the distribution of the 678 REIT property portfolio change events by year of
announcement with the classification of the events in terms of the property-type focus change. I
employ the definition of property portfolio change developed by Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans
(2003). They regard portfolio change as a single transaction in which two or more unrelated
properties are traded from the same seller in a same date. REIT typically trades a group of
properties from institutional investors or other real estate firms.

Panel A shows 228 property acquisitions and 235 property dispositions by REITs. In terms of the
property-type focus change, 61 acquisitions decreased the property-type focus of a REIT. The
other 167 acquisitions reconfirmed the REIT’s property-type focus (same property-type
acquisition) which did not alter property-type focus. Of the 235 property dispositions, 71 events
increase property-type focus of the REIT. 164 property-type dispositions are neutral dispositional
events which do not to change property-type focus.
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Panel B in Table 3 shows the136 acquisitional JVs and 79 dispositional JVs created by REITs
during the sample period. According to Campbell, White-Huckins, and Sirmans (2006), an
―acquisitional‖ JV is defined as a JV that is established as a vehicle for obtaining property at a
reduced acquisition cost. They define ―dispositional‖ JV as a JV that seeks to obtain cash or
increase liquidity by partially disposing properties to the JV partner (usually a financier). I find
that 22 acquisitional JVs can be classified as events which decreased the property-type focus of
the REIT with the remaining 114 acquisitional JVs reconfirming the property-type focus of the
REIT. Also, 8 announcements of other property-type dispositional JV are identified as property
portfolio changes which increase the property-type focus of the REIT. 71 same property-type
dispositional JVs have neutral dispositional events which do not change the property-type focus
of the REIT.

Abnormal Returns
The results of the event study associated with announcements of property acquisition (Panel A)
and property disposition (Panel B) are presented in Table 4. Each portfolio provides three mean
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in one-day (0), two-day (0, +1) and three-day (-1, 0, +1)
windows around the announcement date.

In Panel A, all abnormal returns for the acquisition events as a whole are not significantly
different from zero. However, to investigate the effects of property-type focus change, I
segregate the 61 acquisitions that reduce the focus of the REIT from those that reconfirm their
property-type focus. The results indicate that acquisitions which decrease the property-type focus
of the REIT show significantly negative abnormal returns in all event windows and more than
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60% of the results are negative in one- and two-day window. By contrast, in 167 same propertytype acquisitions, abnormal returns in one- and two-day window are significantly positive at 10%
confidence level. The difference test between the two groups is statistically significant over all
event windows. The results indicate property acquisitions that decrease the property-type focus
cause a negative reaction in the market. This finding is evidence of diversification discount to
support the research hypothesis (H2).

In Panel B in Table 4, the overall disposition announcements exhibit positive abnormal returns
with significantly positive values in all windows. Again I separate the sample, distinguishing
between those dispositions that sharpen the focus of the REIT by selling ―other‖ property-types
and same property-type dispositions which have no material impact on the focus of the REIT.
The 71 dispositions that increase the property-type focus (other property-type dispositions) of the
REIT show significantly positive abnormal returns in the one- and three-day windows. The twoday window is also shows a positive abnormal return although it is not statistically significant.
In 164 same property-type dispositions, abnormal returns in two- and three-day windows are
significantly positive, consistent with Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006). On the basis of the
difference test between the two groups, the abnormal returns on other property-type dispositions
are not statistically different from those derived from the same property-type dispositions.

This result is not especially surprising. A number of prior studies find that asset dispositions by
firms provide significant benefits to shareholders. For example, Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans
(2006) find that abnormal returns resulting from major sales of real property by US REITs are
significantly positive. They argue that the results support that the positive abnormal returns are
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derived mainly from the value of efficient asset reallocation (property disposition). Consistent
with their study, I find evidence of positive abnormal returns on all disposition announcements.
However, I find no evidence to support the hypothesis that the significant positive market
reaction results from dispositions that increase property-type focus since the abnormal returns are
not significantly higher than those of same property-type dispositions.

To confirm the findings of Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003), I examine the effects of
property geographical focus changes by REITs in Panel C. I separate property acquisitions into
two groups: those acquisitions that decrease geographical focus (58) and those acquisitions that
reconfirm their geographical focus (170). I find that acquisitions which decrease geographical
focus of the REIT (other geographical location acquisition) show significantly negative abnormal
returns in one- and two-day events while acquisitions that reconfirm the same geographical focus
have no significant abnormal returns. The difference test between two groups is statistically
significant in all event windows, which is consistent with Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003).
They argue that this cost of diversification supports the notion that shareholders of REITs give
greater value to corporate focus rather than diversification since investors prefer to form their
own diversification decisions.

Table 5 shows the results of the event study associated with announcements of acquisitional JV
(Panel A) and dispositional JV (Panel B). In Panel A, all abnormal returns for overall
acquisitional JVs are significantly positive, consistent with Campbell, White-Huckins, and
Sirmans (2006). When distinguishing 22 other property-type acquisitional JVs from those which
reconfirm their property-type focus, the results indicate that the acquisitional JVs that decrease
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property-type focus of REIT have a low or negative level of abnormal returns and no
significance in all event windows. In 114 same property-type acquisitional JVs, however,
abnormal returns in all event windows are large and significantly positive. The difference
between the two groups is statistically significant. This result provides additional support for my
research hypothesis (H2) although the market reaction to JV events that decrease the propertytype focus is not significantly negative.

In Panel B in Table 5, the results indicate that dispositional JV announcements which increase
property-type focus (other property-type dispositional JV) yield significantly positive abnormal
returns. The difference test shows they are also significantly higher than the same property-type
dispositional JVs in two- and three-days window. This finding supports the research hypothesis
(H1).

Cross-Sectional Regression
Table 6 shows the summary statistics for the raw REIT data used to generate the variables in the
cross-sectional regression analysis over the sample period. I present average, minimum, and
maximum values of the total REIT assets, total REIT debt, percentage of institutional
shareholders, and the number of analysts at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement
of the property portfolio change. Funds from Operations are earned during the last quarter prior
to the announcement of the property portfolio change.

Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of continuous variables in cross-sectional regression
analysis over the sample period. The dependent variable in the cross-sectional regression, CAR
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(2), is a two-day (days 0, +1) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for an equally balanced
portfolio around the event announcement. The deal size ratio is the total price of property
portfolio change divided by the firm’s total assets (SIZER). As suggested by Table 2, the deal
size ratio for joint ventures is nearly four times larger than property acquisitions and dispositions.
The other variables used in the regression are reasonably consistent among the groups of
transactions investigated. Panel D shows correlation coefficients among the independent
variables. As we might expect, the correlation among between the firm size (lnSIZE),
institutional ownership (INST) and number of analysts is relatively high indicating that larger
REITs attract higher institutional ownership and greater analyst interest. Correlation among the
other continuous variables is generally low.

Table 8 presents cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions with a heteroskedastic
adjustment following MacKinnon and White (1985). The regressions use 463 property portfolio
changes deriving from acquisitions and dispositions to test the significance of the relationship
between abnormal returns and a set of control variables discussed above. The regressand is the
two-day (days 0, +1) cumulative abnormal return; CAR (2). During the entire sample period, I
find that the indicator variable (PROPD) for acquisitions that decrease REIT property-type focus
is significantly negative. This suggests that portfolio changes that decrease REIT property-type
focus reduce value, confirming my earlier findings presented in Table 4. As a robustness check, I
repeated the analysis for two sub-periods. (1990 – 1999 and 2000 – 2009) and find consistent
results.
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However, I find that the other primary variable (PROPF) for property dispositions which
increase property-type focus (other property-type dispositions) is not significantfor the total
sample period. Only during the sub-period 1990 – 1999 do I find a significantly positive
coefficient.

With respect to our control variables, during overall sample period, I find no significant
relationship of firm size (lnSIZE) or deal size ratio (SIZER) to abnormal returns. Debt ratios also
are not related to abnormal returns and have no significant coefficient over all sample periods.
This result is consistent with Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006). Also, I find no significant
relationship between the FFO and abnormal returns. Thus I find no support for a diversification
discount derived from endogeneity as argued by Villaonga (2004). Lastly abnormal returns are
also not related to whether the transaction is an acquisition or a disposition.

A number of control variables are significantly related to abnormal returns.

Institutional

ownership (INST) exhibits a significantly negative relationship with abnormal returns. A higher
degree of institutional ownership results in more significant negative reaction to the
announcement of a REIT’s property portfolio change that decreases a REIT’s property-type
focus. I find a significantly positive coefficient for the number of analyst (ANALY) over the
entire sample period, confirming evidence found in prior literature. Ferris and Sarin (2000) find
that more diversified firms have less analyst following, which results in more informational
asymmetry and a negative impact on the value of the diversified firm. Also, Chung and Jo (1996)
find that the number of security analysts positively affects the market value of the firm.
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Consistent with the the findings of Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003), I find that a decrease
the geographical focus results in negative abnormal returns.

Table 9 shows the results of the regression on abnormal returns in 215 joint venture
announcements. As with individual transactions, PROPD is significantly negative for the entire
sample period which supports research hypothesis (H2). The market has a significant negative
reaction to the events that decreases a REIT’s property-type focus. However, I again find no
evidence to support research hypothesis (H1); the coefficient PROPF is not significant. Thus I
find no significant positive market reaction to the increase in property-type focus,

I do find a significantly positive coefficient for the deal size ratio (SIZER). This implies that
higher value deals cause a positive market reaction, consistent with evidence found by Campbell,
Petrova and Sirmans (2006). As presented by Table 7, the deal size ratios for joint ventures are
substantially larger than for property transactions, which may be leading to an increase in the
positive relationship between the deal size and cumulative abnormal return. Consistent with the
results for transactions in Table 8, the coefficient for the number of analyst (ANALY) is
significantly positive over all sample periods. The indicator variable for acquisitional JVs
(ACDS) is also significantly positive. This supports the findings shown in Table 5. Abnormal
returns for acquisitional JVs tend to be significantly positive. This confirms results found by
Capbell, White-Huckins, and Sirmans (2006). None of the other variable used in the regression
are significant.
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Robustness Check
As a robustness check of the results, I combine property portfolio transaction events (acquisitions
and dispositions) and JV events (acquisitional JVs and dispositional JVs) as shown in Table 10.
This is a comprehensive analysis combining the results of Table 4 (property transactions) with
the results presented in Table 5 (JVs).

Panel A shows significantly positive abnormal returns in one- and two-day windows for all
acquisitional events including acquisitions and acquisitional JVs. When segregating 83 other
property-type acquisitional events from 281 events to reconfirm their property-type focus, I find
that acquisitional events which decrease property-type focus cause a significantly negative
market reaction while same property-type acquisitional events yield significantly positive
abnormal returns. The difference test between the two groups is statistically significant over all
event windows and supports research hypothesis (H2) of a diversification discount.

The results of Panel B in Table 10 are not very different from those of dispositional events
included in Table 4 and Table 5. 79 dispositional events that increase property-type focus yields
a significantly positive market reaction over all event windows. In terms of the difference test
between other property-type dispositional events versus same property-type dispositional events,
dispositional events that increase property-type focus are not significantly different from the
same property-type dispositional events in the two- and three-day windows. Again I fail to find
evidence in support of research hypothesis (H1): the positive market reaction to the events which
increase their narrow property-type focus.
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Table 11 presents cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions using the entire 678
property-type portfolio change sample combining two groups: all property transactions including
acquisitions & dispositions (Table 8) and all joint ventures (Table 9). The overall results are very
consistent with those of Table 8 for property transactions. Regardless of the time frame, I find
that the variable (PROPD) indicating an acquisition (Transaction or JV) that decreases REIT
property-type focus provokes a significantly negative market reaction. This suggests that
portfolio changes that decrease REIT property-type focus reduce value. However, the other
primary variable (PROPF) for property portfolio changes which increase property-type focus
(other dispositions and dispositional JVs) indicates no significance over all time periods.

Relative to the type of event (acquisition, disposition, acquisitional JV and dispositional JV)
property acquisitions are controlled for using ADJV_Ac, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the property portfolio change derives from an acquisition and 0 otherwise. Property dispositions
are controlled for using ADJV_Dis, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the property
portfolio change derives from a disposition and 0 otherwise. Acquisitional JVs are controlled for
using ADJV_JVA, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives
from acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise. The reference group for these dummy variables is
dispositional JVs. I find evidence to support the notion that acquisitional events including
acquisitions (ADJV_Ac), and acquisitional JVs (ADJV_JVA) have significantly larger abnormal
returns than dispositions and dispositional JVs events.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Conclusion
A fundamental question in terms of property-type diversification strategies is why there is a
conflict between the investment behavior of large institutional real estate investors and Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). REITs show a strong tendency to invest in only one particular
property-type while large institutional real estate investors tend to own and manage properties
broadly diversified by property-type. Geltner and Miller (2001) argue that earlier REITs had
often been diversified by property-type because REIT investors were best served by a diversified
portfolio of properties by employing passive investment vehicles. But in the 1990s, REIT
investors became dominated by institutions that prefer to make their own diversification
decisions and REITs responded to the needs of their investors by becoming more focused.

In this dissertation, I investigate the issue of what drives the property sector focus of REITs. I
examine the above argument of Geltner and Miller (2001), which addresses the research question
of how investors react to a change in a REIT’s property type focus. If investors prefer to make
their own portfolio diversification decisions by employing property-type focused REITs, I
hypothesize that investors will react positively to a REIT’s property portfolio changes which
increase their narrow property type focus (H1). Conversely, investors should react negatively to
events which decrease a REIT’s property type focus (H2).

To examine the research hypothesis, I take three research processes. First, I obtain event
announcements of the property portfolio changes including transactions and JV formations of
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REITs over the sample period, 1990-2009. Then, I classify the samples of property portfolio
change: acquisitional events that decrease property-type focus, neutral acquisitional events which
do not change property-type focus, dispositional events which increase property-type focus, and
neutral dispositional events which do not change property-type focus. Secondly, I employ
standard event study methodology to investigate the abnormal return around the event
announcements and apply it to the groups classified in the first step. Lastly, I use a crosssectional OLS regression analysis to examine the relationship between abnormal returns on
property portfolio changes and a set of potential variables of interest.

I find evidence of significantly negative abnormal returns for acquisition and acquisitional JV
events that decrease property-type focus. Abnormal returns for these acquisitional events are
significantly more negative than those for neutral acquisitional events which do not change
property-type focus. I also find significantly negative abnormal returns for acquisitions which
decrease geographical focus consistent with Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003). This is
strong evidence of the diversification discount to support research hypothesis (H2). However, I
do not find consistent support that dispositional events which increase property-type focus have
significantly positive abnormal returns (H1). Only in the limited case of other property-type
dispositional JVs do I find a statistically significant positive market reaction relative to those
derived from the neutral dispositional events on the basis of the difference test.

In terms of the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions, I find strong evidence of
diversification discount derived from acquisitional events that decrease property-type focus of
the REIT regardless of the sample period and type of property portfolio change. However, I do

40

not find evidence of a wealth benefit received by dispositional events which increase propertytype focus.

In addition, I find that the deal size of property portfolio change and the number of security
analyst are significant variables that affect the abnormal returns on announcement of property
portfolio changes. I also find no evidence to support the idea that the diversification discount
comes from endogeneity as argued by Villanova (2004).

In sum, my results support hypothesis (H2). Namely the market reacts significantly negative to
acquisitions that decrease the focus of a REIT. Furthermore, strictly speaking, my results do not
support hypothesis (H1), that dispositional events which increase property-type focus should
provoke a significant positive market reaction. However, it should be noted that the market’s
reaction to dispositional events that narrow property-type focus as measured in this study are, in
fact, positive albeit not in a statistically significant fashion. This finding may potentially be
explained by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect Theory asserts that
people tend to be more severely psychologically impacted by losses or negative events than gains
or positive events. This phenomenon is known as loss aversion. Thus we could expect to see a
much stronger negative market reaction to events that investors do not like (REITs losing focus),
in comparison to the investors’ positive reaction to events that investors do like (REITs
increasing focus). Overall the results of this event study and cross-sectional regression analysis
support the theory proposed by Geltner and Miller (2001) which postulates that investors prefer
to make their own diversification decisions using narrowly focused property-type REITs.
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Future Direction
In this dissertation, I employ property portfolio changes including acquisitions, dispositions, and
joint ventures of property-type focused REITs to examine the research question, what drives the
property sector focus of REITs. In terms of the sample selection, I exclude property-type
diversified REITs due to the difficulty in defining the property portfolio change which increases
or decreases property-type focus. However, a future study could suggest the opposite research
question: what makes diversified or hybrid REITs tend to be diversified? For example, Campbell,
White-Huckins and Sirmans (2006) find significantly positive abnormal returns on joint ventures
when a diversified REIT is a JV partner. They argue that the JV may diminish the effect of the
diversification discount associated with a diversified REIT by providing a vehicle partnering
with specialized expertise.

The diversified nature of diversified REITs or hybrid REITs may

yield a different market reaction to their property portfolio changes compared to focused REITs.

I also find a significantly negative relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal
returns from property portfolio changes. However, Below, Stansell, and Coffin (2000) find that
different types of institutional investors have different investment objectives and needs. Thus, a
future research could examine how abnormal returns on property portfolio changes of REITs are
affected by different types of institutional investors.

Geltner and Miller (2001) argue another possible explanation of the REIT’s general lack of
diversification is that analysts can more easily understand REITs that specialize in one of the
standard market segments in comparison to multiple market segments. Future research could
investigate how security analysts affect REIT property-type diversification.
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Table 1 ▪ Summary statistics for acquisition, disposition, acquisitional joint venture and dispositional joint venture by US REITs, by
announcement period over the year 1990 – 2009 and REIT property type

Number of Announcements

Entire Period

Year

1990 - 2009

1990-1993

1994-1997

1998-2001

2002-2005

2006-2009

8

(1.7%)

0

1

0

4

3

Panel A: Acquisition & Disposition
REIT property-type
Health Care REIT
Office/ Industrial REIT

133

(28.7%)

2

29

36

36

30

Lodging / Resorts REIT

68

(14.7%)

0

11

12

23

22

Residential REIT

116

(25.1%)

1

26

29

38

22

Retail REIT

135

(29.2%)

3

16

31

49

36

(0.6%)

0

0

0

0

3

6

83

108

150

116

Self-Storage REIT
Total

3
463

Panel B: Acquisitional JV & Dispositional JV
REIT property-type
Health Care REIT

8

(4.7%)

0

2

2

0

4

Office/ Industrial REIT

61

(27.9%)

0

3

35

12

11

Lodging / Resorts REIT

20

(9.3%)

0

4

6

5

5

Residential REIT

31

(14.4%)

0

4

18

5

4

Retail REIT

86

(39.1%)

0

9

27

14

36

9

(4.7%)

0

1

6

0

2

0

23

94

36

62

Self-Storage REIT
Total

215

Notes: Data include acquisitions, dispositions and joint ventures announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters Newswires. The
announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day if the
announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the
announcement. I exclude a transaction from the sample if other significant events are announced during the event window or if a total value of transaction is less
than $ 5 million. I employ property-type classifications for individual REITs obtained from the CRSP/Ziman US Real Estate Data Series which provides return
series for individual REIT trading on the NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange.
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Table 2 ▪ Summary of deal value for data set of 463 real estate transactions (acquisition and disposition) and 215 joint ventures
(acquisitional JV and dispositional JV) by equity REITs by announcement period over the year 1990 – 2009

Deal Value ($M)

Entire Period

Year

1990 - 2009

1990-1993

1994-1997

1998-2001

2002-2005

2006-2009

Average Deal Size

37.35

15.65

16.64

48.20

36.63

44.12

Standard Deviation

3.43

2.83

1.74

10.67

4.31

7.26

Minimum

5.10

6.58

5.10

5.53

5.85

5.13

Maximum

770.00

23.50

108.00

770.00

321.00

565.00

Average Deal Size

251.99

0.00

63.58

175.62

395.20

354.52

Standard Deviation

26.53

0.00

12.71

21.77

88.78

63.97

Minimum

6.40

0.00

9.50

6.40

10.00

12.00

Maximum

3,000.00

0.00

220.00

1,000.00

2,740.00

3,000.00

Panel A: Acquisition & Disposition (463)

Panel B: Acquisitional JV & Dispositional JV (215)

Notes: Data include acquisitions, dispositions and joint ventures announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters Newswires. The
announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day if the
announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the
announcement. I exclude a transaction from the sample if other significant events are announced during the event window or if a total value of transaction is less
than $ 5 million. ($M: Millions of Dollars)
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Table 3 ▪ Distribution of data set of 463 real estate transactions (acquisition and disposition) and 215 joint ventures (acquisitional JV
and dispositional JV) by equity REITs by announcement period over the year 1990 – 2009

Number of Announcements

Entire Period

Year

Deal Value ($M)

1990 - 2009

1990-1993

1994-1997

1998-2001

2002-2005

2006-2009

1990 - 2009

Panel A: Acquisition & Disposition
Total Acquisition

228

6

51

45

76

50

37.47

Acquisition - Other Property-type

61

5

9

12

24

11

41.57

Acquisition - Same Property-type

167

1

42

33

52

39

35.97

235

0

32

63

74

66

37.22

Disposition - Other Property-type

71

0

18

24

19

10

63.40

Disposition - Same Property-type

164

0

14

39

55

56

25.89

463

6

83

108

150

116

37.35

136

0

20

62

21

33

243.99

Acquisitional JV- Other Property-type

22

0

1

9

5

7

242.19

Acquisitional JV - Same Property-type

114

0

19

53

16

26

244.34

79

0

3

32

15

29

265.76

Dispositional JV - Other Property-type

8

0

0

3

1

4

474.63

Dispositional JV - Same Property-type

71

0

3

29

14

25

242.23

215

0

23

94

36

62

251.99

Total Disposition

Total
Panel B: Acquisitional JV & Dispositional JV
Total Acquisitional JV

Total Dispositional JV

Total

Notes: Data include acquisitions, dispositions and joint ventures announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters Newswires. The
announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day if the
announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the
announcement. I exclude a transaction from the sample if other significant events are announced during the event window or if a total value of transaction is less
than $ 5 million. ($M: Millions of Dollars)
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Table 4 ▪ Announcement period daily and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in percent for REIT shareholders in a sample of 228
acquisitions and 235 dispositions announced over the year 1990 – 2009
Property Transaction Announcements
Panel A: Acquisition
Total Acquisition
Acquisition - Other Property-type
Acquisition - Same Property-type
t - Stats for difference (t critical value)
Panel B: Disposition
Total Disposition
Disposition - Other Property-type
Disposition - Same Property-type
t - Stats for difference (t critical value)
Panel C: Geographical Diversification
Total Acquisition
Acquisition - Other Geographical Location
Acquisition - Same Geographical Location
t - Stats for difference (t critical value)

Day (0)
Obs.

CAR

% Neg.

228

-0.020

61
167

-0.490
0.150

***

-2.690
235
71
164

Day (0, 1)
CAR
% Neg.

0.487

0.020

0.607
0.443

-0.490
0.210

**

***

(1.661)

0.200

**

0.380
0.120

**

Day (-1, 0, +1)
CAR
% Neg.

0.522

0.030

0.623
0.485

-0.430
0.190

*

*

0.525
0.473

-1.628

*

(1.663)

-1.665

**

(1.663)

0.502

0.180

*

0.464

0.310

**

0.472

0.479
0.494

0.210
0.170

0.493
0.451

0.380
0.280

**

*

0.465
0.476

1.284

(1.653)

0.036

(1.653)

0.452

(1.653)

228

-0.020

0.487

0.020

0.522

0.030

0.487

58
170

-0.310
0.070

**

0.638
0.435

-0.370
0.120

*

0.621
0.512

-0.340
0.150

0.569
0.459

-2.003

**

(1.659)

-1.749

**

(1.660)

-2.067

*

0.487

*

**

(1.659)

Notes: Abnormal return is calculated in accordance with standard event study methodology following Mikkelson and Partch (1988). CRSP value weighted
market return is used as the market proxy. Daily returns are obtained from the CRSP database. Estimation period is day -250 to day -20. Day 0 is the
announcement day, which is the first date that news of the agreement is announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters
Newswires. The announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day
if the announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the
announcement.
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5 ▪ Announcement period daily and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in percent for REIT shareholders in a sample of 136
acquisitional joint ventures and 79 dispositional joint ventures announced over the year 1990 – 2009
Day (0)

Joint Venture Announcements
Obs.

CAR

Day (0, 1)
% Neg.

CAR

49.3

0.450

45.5

-0.050

50.0

0.550

-1.225

(1.688)

-2.235

79

-0.340

54.4

-0.320

Dispositional JV - Other Property-type

8

0.150

62.5

0.840

Dispositional JV - Same Property-type

71

-0.400

53.5

-0.450

0.911

(1.796)

1.797

Day (-1, 0, +1)
% Neg.

CAR

% Neg.

42.6

0.450

45.5

0.070

***

42.1

0.530

*

44.7

**

(1.681)

-1.570

*

(1.681)

49.4

-0.060

25.0

1.260

52.1

-0.210

(1.753)

1.405

Panel A: Acquisitional JV
Total Acquisitional JV

136

0.250

Acquisitional JV- Other Property-type

22

0.130

Acquisitional JV - Same Property-type

114

0.270

t - Stats for difference (t critical value)

***

***

***

**

44.1
40.9

Panel B: Dispositional JV
Total Dispositional JV

t - Stats for difference (t critical value)

**

**

44.3

**

37.5
45.1

*

(1.860)

Notes: Abnormal return is calculated in accordance with standard event study methodology following Mikkelson and Partch (1988). CRSP value weighted
market return is used as the market proxy. Daily returns are obtained from the CRSP database. Estimation period is day -250 to day -20. Day 0 is the
announcement day, which is the first date that news of the agreement is announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters
Newswires. The announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day
if the announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the
announcement.
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6 ▪ Summary statistics of data set for variables in regression analysis over the announcement period 1990 – 2009
Mean Value (1900 - 2009)

Sample REITs on Announcements
Total Asset ($M)

Total Debt ($M)

FFO ($M)

Inst. Own.

Analysts

1,950.38
32.67
16,253.00

951.94
0.00
7,085.00

29.31
-25.25
567.20

0.59
0.00
0.99

3.39
0
17

3,054.94
24.61
21,516.68

1,574.65
13.21
14,528.80

47.80
-114.27
1,026.74

0.62
0.00
1.00

4.31
0
18

2,472.60
98.51
18,660.11

1,237.85
20.00
8,593.17

31.09
-3.85
237.44

0.62
0.02
1.00

3.47
0
13

3,926.11
181.10
24,883.37

2,202.81
45.07
12,063.74

40.47
1.41
275.27

0.65
0.00
0.99

3.90
0
13

Panel A: Acquisition (228)
Mean
Minimum
Maximum
Panel B: Disposition (235)
Mean
Minimum
Maximum
Panel C: Acquisitional JV (136)
Mean
Minimum
Maximum
Panel D: Dispositional JV (79)
Mean
Minimum
Maximum

Notes: Accounting data including total asset, debt and Funds from Operations (FFO) are obtained from COMPUSTAT and from 10Q and 10K SEC filings. The
number of analyst data is obtained from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES). Institutional holdings from CDA/Spectrum 13 (f) Institutional Holdings
is provided by Thomson Reuters. All information is data at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement of the property portfolio change. ($M: Millions
of Dollars)
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Table 7 ▪ Summary statistics of continuous variables in regression analysis over the announcement period 1990 – 2009

CAR (2)

lnSIZE

Continuous Variable
SIZER
DEBTR
PFFO

0.001
0.020
-0.203
0.106

21.075
1.205
17.019
23.937

0.061
0.125
0.001
1.458

0.495
0.144
0.000
1.072

0.014
0.014
-0.074
0.210

0.613
0.261
0.000
0.999

3.794
2.987
0
18

0.001
0.019
-0.081
0.106

20.959
1.260
17.019
23.792

0.034
0.054
0.001
0.575

0.493
0.148
0.000
0.991

0.014
0.014
-0.074
0.194

0.603
0.264
0.000
0.997

3.855
3.157
0
18

0.002

21.325

0.119

0.501

0.013

0.634

3.656

0.023
-0.203
0.074

1.037
18.406
23.937

0.195
0.002
1.458

0.135
0.040
0.845

0.015
-0.018
0.210

0.253
0.002
0.999

2.591
0
13

1
-0.216
0.185
-0.050
0.553

1
-0.010
-0.017
-0.051

1
-0.252
0.039

1
-0.037

1

0.499

-0.091

0.010

-0.052

0.371

Summary Statistics (1990 - 2009)
Panel A: Entire Sample (678)
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Panel B: Acquisition & Disposition (463)
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Panel C: Acquisitional JV & Dispositional JV (215)
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Panel D: Correlation Among Continuous Variable
lnSIZE
SIZER
DEBTR
PFFO
INST
ANALY

INST

ANALY

1

Notes: CAR (2) is two-day (days 0, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for an equally balanced portfolio around the event announcement; lnSIZE is the
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; SIZER is the ratio of the total price of property portfolio
change, divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement (SIZE); DEBTRD is the debt ratio of the total debt divided by
total assets of the firm at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; PFFO is the Funds from Operations divided by total assets at the end of the last
quarter prior to the announcement; INST is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total number of outstanding shares at the end of
the last quarter prior to the announcement; ANALY is the number of analyst to forecasts of FFO for REITs at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement.
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Table 8 ▪ Regressions of announcement period abnormal returns in 463 property portfolio changes (acquisition and disposition) by US
REITs over the announcement period 1990 – 2009 and sub-periods

Acquisition & Disposition (463)

Entire Period (1990 - 2009)

1990 - 1999

2000 - 2009

Coefficient

t-stat

Coefficient

t-stat

Constant

0.028

(1.36)

0.112

(3.48)

0.037

PROPD

-0.008

(-2.68)

-0.016

***

(-3.45)

-0.007

PROPF

0.003

(1.21)

0.007

*

(1.72)

0.001

(0.36)

lnSIZE

-0.001

(-0.70)

-0.005

***

(-3.04)

-0.001

(-0.68)

SIZER

0.016

(0.88)

0.068

***

(3.38)

-0.059

DEBTR

-0.010

(-1.59)

-0.008

(-0.88)

-0.010

(-1.26)

PFFO

-0.005

(-0.07)

0.027

(0.22)

-0.038

(-0.50)

INST

-0.015

***

(-3.47)

-0.018

(-2.36)

-0.018

***

(-3.46)

ANALY

0.001

**

(2.44)

0.001

*

(1.78)

0.001

**

(2.05)

GEOD

-0.006

**

(-2.02)

-0.008

*

(-1.95)

-0.003

(-0.81)

ACDS

0.002

(0.97)

0.003

(0.81)

0.003

(1.13)

Adj. R
F:

2

***

Coefficient

0.038

0.215

0.039

2.952

4.691

2.449

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.01)

t-stat
(1.32)

**

*

(-2.04)

(-1.94)

Notes: Dependent variable is CAR (2), the two-day (days 0, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for an equally balanced portfolio around the event
announcement; lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; SIZER is the ratio of the total
price of property portfolio change, divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement (SIZE); DEBTRD is the debt ratio of
the total debt divided by total assets of the firm at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; PFFO is the Funds from Operations divided by total
assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; INST is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total number of
outstanding shares at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; ANALY is the number of analyst to forecasts of FFO for REITs at the end of the last
quarter prior to the announcement; PROPD is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change decreases property-type focus and 0 otherwise; PROPF
is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change increase property-type focus and 0 otherwise; GEOD is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property
portfolio change decreases geographical focus and 0 otherwise; ACDS is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from acquisition or
acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise.
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 9 ▪ Regressions of announcement period abnormal returns in 215 property portfolio changes (acquisitional joint venture and
dispositional joint venture) by US REITs over the announcement period 1990 – 2009 and sub-periods

Joint Venture (215)

Entire Period (1990 - 2009)
Coefficient

Constant

-0.049

PROPD

-0.012

PROPF

1990 - 1999

t-stat

Coefficient

(-1.20)

-0.062

(-1.81)

-0.023

0.002

(0.19)

lnSIZE

0.002

SIZER

0.015

DEBTR

2000 - 2009
t-stat

Coefficient

t-stat

(-1.17)

-0.037

(-0.58)

(-2.08)

-0.010

(-1.13)

-0.007

(-0.31)

0.004

(0.36)

(0.94)

0.002

(0.98)

0.002

(0.54)

(1.85)

0.038

(2.73)

0.008

(0.75)

-0.006

(-0.49)

-0.009

(-0.67)

-0.017

(-0.79)

PFFO

-0.079

(-0.73)

-0.398

(-1.21)

-0.082

(-0.63)

INST

-0.001

(-0.20)

0.008

(0.77)

-0.004

(-0.45)

(2.48)

0.002

**

(2.32)

**

(1.99)

*

*

**

***

ANALY

0.002

***

(3.39)

0.002

ACDS

0.009

**

(2.42)

0.007

(1.43)

0.010

(1.16)

0.024

(1.57)

0.004

JVRT
Adj. R
F:

0.009
2

**

0.073

0.146

0.022

2.939

2.699

1.524

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.13)

(0.44)

Notes: Dependent variable is CAR (2), the two-day (days 0, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for an equally balanced portfolio around the event
announcement; lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; SIZER is the ratio of the total
price of property portfolio change, divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement (SIZE); DEBTRD is the debt ratio of
the total debt divided by total assets of the firm at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; PFFO is the Funds from Operations divided by total
assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; INST is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total number of
outstanding shares at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; ANALY is the number of analyst to forecasts of FFO for REITs at the end of the last
quarter prior to the announcement; PROPD is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change decreases property-type focus and 0 otherwise; PROPF
is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change increase property-type focus and 0 otherwise; ACDS is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property
portfolio change derives from acquisition or acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise; JVRT is dummy variable equal to 1 if a JV partner is another REIT and 0 otherwise.
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 10 ▪ Announcement period daily and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in percent for REIT shareholders in a sample of 364
acquisitional events (acquisitions and acquisitional JVs) and 314 dispositional events (dispositions and dispositional JVs) over the y
Day (0)
Obs.

CAR

Day (0, 1)
% Neg.

CAR

Day (-1, 0, +1)
% Neg.

CAR

% Neg.

Panel A: Acquisition & Acquisitional JV
Total Acquisitional Events

364

0.080

*

0.489

0.180

**

0.486

0.190

0.470

Acquisitional Events - Other Property-type

83

-0.320

**

0.566

-0.370

**

0.578

-0.300

0.494

Acquisitional Events - Same Property-type

281

0.200

***

0.466

0.340

***

0.459

0.330

**

0.463

-3.078

***

(1.657)

-2.493

***

(1.657)

-2.288

**

(1.657)

0.513

0.060

*

0.471

0.220

**

0.465

0.532

0.280

**

0.468

0.470

**

0.456

0.506

-0.020

0.472

0.130

*

0.468

(1.652)

0.818

(1.651)

1.012

t - Stats for difference (t critical value)
Panel B: Disposition & Dispositional JV
Total Dispositional Events

314

0.060

Dispositional Events - Other Property-type

79

0.360

Dispositional Events - Same Property-type

235

-0.040

t - Stats for difference (t critical value)

1.934

**

**

(1.654)

Notes: Abnormal return is calculated in accordance with standard event study methodology following Mikkelson and Partch (1988). CRSP value weighted
market return is used as the market proxy. Daily returns are obtained from the CRSP database. Estimation period is day -250 to day -20. Day 0 is the
announcement day, which is the first date that news of the agreement is announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters
Newswires. The announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day
if the announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the
announcement.
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 11 ▪ Regressions of announcement period abnormal returns in 678 property portfolio changes (acquisition, disposition,
acquisitional joint venture and dispositional joint venture) by US REITs over the announcement period 1990 – 2009 and sub-periods
All Sample

Entire Period (1990 - 2010)
Coefficient

Constant
PROPD
PROPF
lnSIZE
SIZER
DEBTR
PFFO
INST
ANALY
GEOD
ADJV_Ac
ADJV_Dis
ADJV_JVA
Adjusted R2
F:

0.010
-0.006
-0.001
0.000
0.016
-0.007
-0.044
-0.010
0.001
-0.005
0.006
0.003
0.005
0.037
3.153

**

**

***
***
*
**

*

1990 - 1999

2000 - 2009

t-stat

Coefficient

t-stat

Coefficient

t-stat

(0.53)
(-2.35)
(-0.20)
(-0.30)
(2.33)
(-1.27)
(-0.77)
(-2.72)
(3.52)
(-1.68)
(1.96)
(0.99)
(1.78)

0.063
-0.009
-0.004
-0.003
0.041
-0.004
-0.032
-0.003
0.001
-0.005
0.007
0.004
0.003
0.091
2.744

(2.21)
(-2.20)
(-0.82)
(-2.34)
(3.57)
(-0.52)
(-0.25)
(-0.45)
(2.47)
(-1.26)
(1.35)
(0.69)
(0.60)

-0.001
-0.007
0.002
0.001
0.006
-0.011
-0.068
-0.014
0.001
-0.004
0.005
0.002
0.009
0.059
2.379

(-0.04)
(-1.99)
(0.47)
(0.45)
(0.69)
(-1.43)
(-1.04)
(-3.06)
(2.68)
(-1.06)
(1.46)
(0.70)
(2.20)

(0.00)

(0.00)

**

**
***

**

**

**
***

***

**

(0.01)

Notes: Dependent variable is CAR (2), the two-day (days 0, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for an equally balanced portfolio around the event
announcement; lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; SIZER is the ratio of the total
price of property portfolio change, divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement (SIZE); DEBTRD is the debt ratio of
the total debt divided by total assets of the firm at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; PFFO is the Funds from Operations divided by total
assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; INST is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total number of
outstanding shares at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; ANALY is the number of analyst to forecasts of FFO for REITs at the end of the last
quarter prior to the announcement; PROPD is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change decreases property-type focus and 0 otherwise; PROPF
is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change increase property-type focus and 0 otherwise; GEOD is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property
portfolio change decreases geographical focus and 0 otherwise; ADJV_Ac is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from acquisition
and 0 otherwise; ADJV_Dis is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from disposition and 0 otherwise; ADJV_JVA is dummy
variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise.
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure 1 ▪ Property-type Allocation for the CRSP / Ziman Equity REITs Index (1980-2009)
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